2007-08-05

[松泉专栏] 流动性盛宴的终结

本页标题和正文均由AI机器翻译,未经人工审校。准确内容请以韩文原文为准。

过去几年推动全球金融市场的最重要变量之一,就是充裕的流动性。若干积极的基本面因素加速了流动性的扩张。新兴市场国家不断扩大的贸易收支也助推了这种过剩流动性的产生。过剩流动性又再生产出过剩流动性。贪婪把全球流动性推向了近期未曾见到的泡沫水平。随着全球金融市场的波动率和信用利差降至创纪录低位,股指创下历史新高。

分析全球金融市场未来的最重要标准之一,在于这种流动性周期的演变方式。全球流动性的扩张趋势可能已经结束。全球投资正变得更加艰难。

过去两年,美国信用市场是吸引热钱的主要区域之一。美国信用市场上由流动性引发的利差追逐,其强度与狂热,可以用下面的故事来说明。

笔者有一位相识多年的债券销售员。他说过去三年一次债券交易都没有做过,只做结构性贷款、信用和衍生品交易。这说明投资者为追求更高收益,不惜承担杠杆以及信用、流动性风险,美国资金在信用领域的风险正在加大。

华尔街之外的许多人仍把美国的信用问题归咎于次级贷款。但这并非事实。次贷问题并没有大到足以改变全球流动性走向。问题在于美国整个信用市场。当前美国信用风险的价格调整,是信用市场正在进行去杠杆(通过减少借贷、出售股份来改善经营状况)的强烈信号。近来华尔街传出的喧嚣,不过是流动性如退潮般流走的声音。

有人或许会疑惑,为何美国金融市场的去杠杆过程会冲击全球市场的股票或其他资产。既然过剩流动性的后遗症在美国,为何美国之外的其他资产也要受到冲击?

这种相关性正在增强。如果说低于基本面的资本成本曾帮助提振美国经济,那么没有它,美国的增长就会更慢。这种情况下,世界其他地区的经济增长也会放缓。这意味着美国发生的事件会影响美国之外的市场和经济。

全球市场的核心议题是美国去杠杆的幅度和规模。这时焦点在于按揭成本的变化、信用衍生品的解约、结构性贷款的价格与可获得性,以及缺乏流动性的信用产品的按市值计价等。考虑到这种去杠杆的复杂性,美国信用市场的波动率短期内仍将维持高位。此外,考虑到投资赎回和追加保证金要求可能引发被迫去杠杆,任何主要市场崩溃的情景都不能排除。金融市场的历史告诉我们,在大规模去杠杆中不可能有秩序地撤退。

回到几年前。韩国经历了信用卡危机。当时问题局限于信用卡领域,但信用调整的冲击严重且持续很久。这种去杠杆过程不仅影响金融机构,也影响了所有在泡沫时期受益的人。

在韩国,受害者是超出自身能力借钱的消费者。美国信用市场将要面临的情形与此类似。过剩流动性使信用风险被定价得低于其本来面貌。会有一个调整期。债权人在整理账簿的同时会减少放贷,债务人则不得不支付更高的风险溢价。与韩国一样,这绝不是短期内就能结束的调整。也就是说需要时间。如果全球流动性正在退潮,投资者应该增加风险还是减少风险?我们需要更加谨慎地观察世界。

● 英文原文内容

The Sound of an Ebbing Liquidity

One of the most important variables that fueled global financial markets for the past few years was the abundant liquidity. Some positive fundamental factors indeed drove the liquidity creation. Healthy balance sheets of many emerging markets helped to create this excess liquidity. However with a predictable financial and economic behavior, the excess liquidity created even more excess liquidity. Greed fueled the global liquidity conditions to a frothy level not seen in modern times. During this period, volatility of global financial markets fell to record lows, equity indexes it all time highs, and credit spread declined to record lows. One of the most important factors to analyze the future of global financial markets is how this liquidity cycle will evolve. On this light, we can conclude that the trend of rising global liquidity could be over. Now we need to begin valuing financial markets in a declining liquidity condition. Global investing has just become tougher.

One of the areas that attracted hot liquidity over the past two years has been the credit market in the US. The intensity and frenzy of liquidity chasing spreads in the credit market in the US can be best illustrated by the following story. One bond salesman I have known for many years told me that he has not done any bond transactions for the past 3 years. He is only brokering structured loan, credit, derivative trades. What this tells us is that US money has taken increasing risk in the credit space. As investors searched for additional return, investors embraced leverage, credit, and liquidity risks.

Many people outside the Wall Street still refer to credit problem in the US as a “sub-prime” issue. This is not true. Sub-prime problem is small and cannot turn the global liquidity. The problem is the entire credit market in the US. The recent adjustment of price of credit risk in the US is a strong signal that the de-leveraging is underway in the US credit market. The recent noise from the Wall Street is the sound of an ebbing liquidity.

Some might ask why should a de-leveraging process in the US financial market impact price of equities or other financial assets around the world. If the excess liquidity hangover is in the US, why should other assets get impacted outside the US? The linkage is through growth. If the “cheaper-than-fundamental” cost of capital helped to boost the US growth, then without it, the US trend growth should be slower. If this were to take place, economic growth of the rest of the world will have to moderate. This is how the events in the US will impact economies and markets outside the US.

So the key question for the global markets is the pace and magnitude of the de-leveraging that will take place in the US. The areas to focus on are the changes to cost of mortgages, unwind of credit derivatives, price and availability of structured loans, and an orderly mark-to-market of illiquid credit products. Given the complexity of this de-leveraging process, it is safe to say that volatility in credit market in the US is likely to stay high for a while. Also, given the potential scenario of a forced de-leveraging coming from investor redemptions and margin calls, we cannot rule out a scenario of a significant market disruption that can impact the global markets negatively. Financial market history tells us that there is never an “orderly de-leveraging” when the amount involved is this large.

Just a few years back, Korea experience a credit card crisis. The problem was confined to the credit card space, but the impact from the credit adjustment was severe and lasting. This de-leveraging process impacted both the financial institutions and those who benefited from the bubble. In Korea’s case, it was the consumers who borrowed beyond their means who went through a difficult adjustment process. What is ahead for the US credit market is similar to this. Excess liquidity has priced credit risk much lower than it should be. Thus there will be an adjustment period. The lenders will lend less as they clean up their book and the borrowers will have to pay higher risk premium to maintain their leverage. This, as was the case in Korea, is never a quick adjustment. It will take time for the US to work this out. If the global liquidity is ebbing, should investors be increasing or decreasing risk? Meanwhile, we should look at the world with a more cautious view.

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