乔哈娜·麦吉尔里记者/科威特城 在漆黑夜晚的热气中,明亮的钨丝灯照亮了排列在多哈基地操场上的艾布拉姆斯坦克、布莱德利战车和悍马装甲车。从得克萨斯空运而来、正经历时滞适应困难的第一批3500名士兵启动了将开赴沙漠的装备,加大了引擎转速。他们处于战时态势,一旦萨达姆·侯赛因的共和国卫队部队真正推进,就会立即投入战区。罗伯特·波拉德上校说:“我们来到这里是为了发出一个信号。这个信号就是我们已做好战斗准备。”通过上周在科威特增兵部署,美国具体落实了在与伊拉克对决中最新的一步举措,这加剧了海湾地区的紧张局势,也让盟友们猜测谁会赢得多少。 尽管多哈的夜间行动是美军一系列增兵部署的一部分——投入4700名地面部队、8架隐形战斗轰炸机、在巴林部署F-16战斗机、增加部署爱国者导弹连以及投入23艘作战舰艇——但军事紧张似乎日益缓和。美军部队正式出发是为参加名为“内在行动96-3”的演习,而非真正的进攻代号。萨达姆暂时保持沉默,未对在禁飞区巡逻的飞机射击。他似乎正在撤除地对空导弹和机动发射架。美国撤回了“不成比例”报复的威胁。最近这一轮对峙是否实质结束,取决于难以预测的伊拉克统治者的任意意志。波拉德上校说:“如果他继续展示肌肉,我们就必须部署军力以维护和平、保护国家利益。”然而,随着大部分美军军官越来越确信美国已暂时压制了伊拉克的军事冒险主义,下一个实质性关切便是造成了多大的政治和外交打击。 几乎所有人都担心,这场危机的最大牺牲品是1991年对萨达姆战争中形成的西方与阿拉伯的联盟。伊拉克外交部副部长里亚德·阿尔·凯西在接受《时代》杂志采访时嗤笑道:“联盟现在在哪里?我看不到任何联盟。”在华盛顿,上周美国中央情报局(CIA)局长约翰·多伊奇在国会表示,伊拉克在地区内的政治地位有所改善。他还表示,美国的空中轰炸首次未获得支持,这多少令人震惊。但在匆忙结束盟国访问后,国防部长威廉·佩里宣布“联盟依然稳固”。 要凝聚对美国举措的支持,需要积极的外交。最严重的冷遇似乎来自科威特——这个在萨达姆入侵时被联盟解救的国家。科威特曾公开将美国政府增派3500名美军的计划搁置一天。但官员们承认,表露不满是华盛顿的失误。一名陆军军官把准备部署的命令误解为最终出动命令,致使国防部在佩里国防部长获得科威特政府许可之前就宣布了部队调动。美国外交官匆忙出面,向科威特王族承认失误、收拾损害,随后迅速执行了科威特实际上曾催促华盛顿实施的增兵。 更大的争论围绕萨达姆的行动是否使华盛顿的反应正当化而展开。科威特一位官员说:“西方打击阿拉伯国家令人不快并引起不安”,“如果理由没有立即变得明确,不安感就会更大。”为消除不安,佩里部长在5个中东国家度过3天。据科威特的一位西方官员说,佩里以如下逻辑进行说服:“萨达姆展示了能够适当而有效地实施复杂军事行动的能力。如果他在北部地区得以蒙混过关,他就会更有信心在真正重要的南部地区如法炮制。” 这种情况在科威特是直观明显的事实。科威特境内数百个被废弃原油沉积形成的黑色湖泊仍覆盖着沙漠,如同来自伊拉克的威胁的潜在见证者。一位西方外交官说:“科威特政府虽然知道美国只是在推行现实可行的政策,但仍反复质问美国为何不能对萨达姆采取更强硬的应对。” 海湾战争结束已过5年,战争痕迹大多消失的今天,盟国正以更为复杂的视角看待伊拉克。对击退萨达姆的感激如今已与新的利益和要求相交织。土耳其的伊斯兰政府力图恢复长期的贸易往来关系。沙特阿拉伯和巴林对日益增长的原理主义者以及打着穆斯林团结旗号的反对派高度警惕。对和平进程难有进展的挫败感在整个阿拉伯世界引发反弹。由于担心实际裂痕的影响,科威特官员四处奔走,以确认海湾其余各方是否理解他们对美国军事行动的支持。一位西方官员指出:“他们的信息是要把人们对美国导弹攻击的关注转向萨达姆的威胁。” 在结束数周外交活动后,官员们主张:“对联盟遏制伊拉克、维持对萨达姆经济制裁这一根本目标的支持没有丝毫动摇。”如果萨达姆试图威胁其国界之外的任何人,盟国将共同出手制止他。但萨达姆保有随时能够动摇联盟的能力。西方外交官指出,最近的冲突证明,当来自伊拉克的威胁不明确、华盛顿方面的正当性不清晰时,“没有人会跳出来支援美国”。实际上,担忧库尔德人跨境威胁的土耳其,曾催促巴格达方面加强对伊拉克北部禁飞区库尔德领土的控制权。土耳其外交部长坦苏·奇莱尔上周在接受《纽约时报》采访时表示:“我们派出了代表团,去询问萨达姆他是否能够在库尔德领土行使中央权威。” 华盛顿对萨达姆的执着痴迷,使一些盟国开始思考在事态发展过程中可能远比最近表面上的不和谐更为严重的裂痕。就连苦心谋求把萨达姆赶下最高位置的科威特官员,也在怀疑美国是否危险地忽视了可能成为海湾地区另一个更大威胁的伊朗。科威特前政府官员、商人阿尔·卡达里说:“70%的科威特人希望除掉萨达姆”,但同时表示:“如果他消失,伊朗将取而代之。那才是更头痛的事。”科威特的一些领导层人士以萨达姆是抵御伊朗的屏障为由,反对让他退位。在海湾任何地方,这种思潮都作为地区力量均衡的一部分而被广泛认可。相当多的专家担心华盛顿是否没有看到更大的图景。美国实际上面对的不是一个魔鬼,而是两个。这或许意味着,在未能成功削减其中一个的同时,放任另一个成长到危险的水平。 [照片] ◇在伊拉克边境以南21公里的科威特沙漠地区,美军士兵正在进行射击训练。 The Agony Of Victory Under what conditions would the coalition sanptogether against Saddam-or fall apart? by JOHANNA MCGEARY/KUWAIT CITY In the black night heat, brilliant tungsten lamps spotlighted ranks of Abrams tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles and Humvees lining the draw yard at Camp Doha, as the first of 3500jet - lagged soldiers from Texas slung their gear aboard and revved the engines for the long drive into the desert. They were on a "combat time line," moving straight into battle position as if Saddam Hussein's Republican Guard troops were really advancing. "We are here to send a signal, and that signal is 'We are ready,'" said Colonel Robert C. Pollard. With its buildup in Kuwait last week, the U.S. very visibly made its latest move in the now-take-that contest with Iraq that has rattled nerves throughout the Persian Gulf and left American allies wondering who is winning what. Despite the nighttime drama at Doha-part of the U.S. force additions that include 4700ground troops, eight Stealth bombers, 23F-16 fighters in Bahrain, a Patriot antimissile battery and 23 combat ships-military tensions seemed to diminish by day. The troops are officially embarked on a training mission dubbed "Intrinsic Action 96-3," hardly the ringing title of a real assault. Saddam stuck to his word,temporarily, by not firing at planes patrolling the no-fly zones. He appeared to be removing his antiaircraft missiles and mobile launchers. The U. S. stepped back from its threat of "disproportionate" retaliation. Whether the latest round of confrontation is really over depends on the whims of Iraq's unfathomable ruler. "If he continues to flex his muscles," says Pollard, "we have to deploy our forces to keep the peace and protect U.S. interests." But with most American officials increasingly confident that the U.S. has squelched Iraq's military adventuring for the moment, the next real concern is how much political and diplomatic damage has been done. Nearly everyone is worried that a prime victim of the crisis is the Western-Arab coalition mustered in 1991 to combat Saddam. Iraqi Deputy Foreign Minister Riyadh al-Qaysi chortled to TIME, "Where is it now? I don't see any coalition." In Washington last week, CIA Director john Deutch told Congress he believed Iraq's political position in the region had improved. He also found it "a little bit shocking" that for the first time there was initially "no support for U.S. air strikes." Yet after a whirlwind trip around the alliance, Secretary of Defense William Perry declared the coalition was "alive and well." Vigorous diplomacy was required to shore up allied support for U.S. actions. The most egregious snub seemed to come from Kuwait, the very nation the coalition rescued from Saddam's grasp, when the U.S. Administration's plan to deploy an added 3500Americans was publicly put on hold for a day. But officials admit the show of pique was Washington's fault: an army officer misread an order to prepare to deploy as the final go-ahead, prompting the Pentagon to announce the troops were going before Perry could seek permission from Kuwait. U.S. diplomats scrambled to repair the damage by confessing their "screw-,up" to Kuwait's Emir, and a deployment that Kuwait had in fact urged on Washington quickly went ahead. The bigger debate was whether what Saddam had done warranted Washington's response. "A Western whack on an Arab state, however unsavory, causes twitchiness," says an official in Kuwait, "and if the reason is not immediately apparent, the twitchiness increases." To calm the twitch, Perry spent three days in five Arab and Middle Eastern capitals. Perry's argument, according to a Western official in Kuwait: "Saddam showed his capacity to do reasonably complicated military operations effectively in a short time, and if he got away with such actions in the north, he would be emboldened to try the same where it was really important 一 in the south." That case was intuitively apparent in Kuwait, where hundreds of stagnant black lakes of wasted crude oil still cover miles of desert, bearing permanent witness to the threat from Iraq. Kuwait' s government, says a Western official, "always asks why the U.S. can't do more against Saddam - though they know the policy the U.S. is pursuing is the only practical one." Farther afield and five years after the war, other coalition members watch Iraq through a more complex lens. Gratitude for defeating Saddam back then is tempered today by new interests and demands. Turkey's Islamist government is keen to revive relations with its old trading partner. Saudi Arabia and Bahrain are mindful of growing fundamentalist and dissident oppositions that demand Muslim solidarity above all. Frustration over the lack of peace progress colors the reaction elsewhere in the Arab world. Fearing the impact of a real rift, Kuwaiti officials fanned out to make sure the rest of the gulf understood their support for U.S.. military moves. "Their message," says a Western official, "was to get attention off the U.S. missile strikes and on Saddam's threat." After the week's diplomatic whirl, officials argue that no major damage has been done to "basic core support" for the fundamental goals of the coalition: containing Iraq and maintaining economic sanctions on Saddam. If he dares to menace anyone outside his borders, the alliance will snap together to oppose him. But Saddam retains a frustrating capacity to unsettle the coalition at any time. And the latest encounter, says a Western official in Kuwait, demonstrates that when the threat from Iraq is not self-evident and the justification from Washington is not clear, "no one will leap to support the U.S." In fact, Turkey, which is worried about cross-border attacks by the Kurds, has urged Baghdad to take control of Kurdish lands in the northern Iraqi no-fly zones. "We have sent a delegation to Saddam to tell him that if he can impose central authority there, O.K.," Turkish Foreign Minister Tansu Ciller told the New York Times last week. Washington's single-minded obsession with Saddam has provoked some allies to think about a rift in the making potentially graver than the latest hubbub. Even in Kuwait, where eagerness to unseat Saddam runs high, officials wonder if the U.S. is dangerously ignoring the region's other and perhaps greater threat* Ira11. "Seventy percent of Kuwaitis just want to get rid of Saddam, " says Mohammed al-Qadiri,a Kuwaiti businessman and former government official. "But the rest worry that if he goes, Iran will step in, and that, my friend, is real trouble. " Some of Kuwait's top leaders have counseled against deposing Saddam because he is needed as a bastion against Ira11. Elsewhere in the gulf, that sentiment is widely endorsed as part of the regional balance of power; Many are concerned that Washington has lost sight of the larger picture. What the U.S. really has to handle is not one devil but two - and it may be letting one grow perilously large while it is trying, however unsuccessfully, to cut the other down to size.
1996-09-25 | 서울경제
胜利之痛 反萨达姆联合阵线的成立与崩溃条件
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