对普通航空旅客而言,如果美国国会提议把美国联邦航空局(FAA)的章程改为“安全第一”,那将是一件令人遗憾的事。那么在那片蓝天上,安全究竟排在第几位?最末位吗? 并非如此。乘坐美国的飞机是全世界最安全的旅行方式之一,而且总体而言安全度还在不断提高。但是FAA在这个问题上的固执,实在应该到此为止了。既要促进航空运输业发展、又要对其进行监管,FAA这种相互矛盾的双重角色,使其在航空安全问题上未能采取足够果断的行动——这一事实已通过数不胜数的研究、媒体揭露报道以及国会听证会而暴露出来。 5月11日,瓦卢杰公司的DC-9飞机坠落在佛罗里达州大沼泽地,该事件受到媒体的高度关注,同时也引发了困惑与愤怒。FAA终于在上周承认,是时候整顿组织、并为1978年开始的放松管制时代收尾了。瓦卢杰总裁刘易斯·乔丹签署了停飞的整改命令,另一家廉价航空公司奇威航空则因飞行员训练不足而被命令削减航班数量。FAA负责航空安全的安东尼·布罗德里克提交了辞呈,FAA局长戴维·欣森与交通部长费德里科·佩纳则保证,将对把飞机维修外包给承包商这类敏感事项进行更为细致的监督。至于提振业界士气,他们认为那是别人的事。如果这样的决定是在110人坠机身亡之后才作出的,那么人们不免怀疑FAA是否真能清除官僚主义、推动真正的变革。 这起坠机事故再次凸显了FAA一直未能妥善监管廉价航空公司的问题。瓦卢杰事故发生后,欣森和佩纳一度大声宣扬要强化航空公司的安全记录。然而随着检查记录大量曝光,人们发现瓦卢杰早在数月前就已多次犯下足以被停飞的违规行为,这类表态便越来越显得不切实际。相当多的FAA监督官向《时代》周刊表示,他们曾向地区办公室和总部递交紧急报告,却被置之不理。也有说法称将调查是否存在犯罪行为。而且,航空局今年年初虽然对瓦卢杰担忧到打算进行专项检查的程度,却直到坠机事故之前都未曾实施。后来实施的30天检查结果显示,飞机带着已知缺陷反复运行,并雇用了无资质的机械师,于是瓦卢杰的客机被拖回机库。 FAA的官员长期有着“宽大宽恕”的惯例。当然,其中多数与航空业界保持密切关系的人,以宣扬顾客因乘坐瓦卢杰这类新兴航空公司而节省数十亿美元为荣。同时,FAA以必须证明收益大于成本为理由,一直回避强制航空公司采用新技术。例如80年代末,FAA在是否强制客机安装近地警告系统的问题上一拖再拖,只是拖延时间。仅凭这一简单装置,就本可预防许多撞机事故。负责调查飞机事故的独立机构——国家运输安全委员会(NTSB)曾建议FAA不仅在撞机事故之后,而且应定期检查飞行记录,以评估飞机和飞行员。这项建议未被采纳。 特别是,尽管航空公司使用外部承包商进行定期维修保养的做法日益普遍,FAA却疏于履行监督义务。虽然据称瓦卢杰事故并非因检查或机械缺陷,而是因使用了标识错误的氧气发生器而发生,但这些发生器是由位于亚利桑那州凤凰城的塞伯技术公司这类分包商提供的。该公司代多家航空公司承办众多服务业务。 瓦卢杰总裁乔丹对这种外部采购方式激烈辩护,称‘这是一流航空公司一直采用的方式。这是非常健全的概念,是好的概念’。确实如此。然而为削减成本的努力,往往连警惕心也一并消除。FAA查明,瓦卢杰把所有飞机维修保养全部交给“地域分散且价格低廉的投标者”,而且公司的监督环节存在“众多缺陷”。据专家表示,航空公司与维修团队之间的关系应当是共生关系。‘你需要训练有素、士气高昂的人。’总部设在亚特兰大的航空顾问路易·史密斯解释说。‘如果在你和这些员工之间插进第三方,这也许会成为问题。’ 然而外部采购方式已根深蒂固。上周FAA承认,对于从维修保养到订票等各项业务全部通过外部采购合同构成的“虚拟航空公司”的出现,自己未能作出妥善应对。 为什么表面上如此重要的联邦机构却如此松懈?首先,FAA正承受财政压力,自1993年以来已流失5000名员工。FAA长期受检查官不足困扰,检查官无法进行检查,反而不得不把越来越多时间投入杂务。加之,FAA是按航空公司的规模而非其所使用分包商的数量来配置检查官。FAA表示,今后将建立更严格的监督与许可体制,改变管理外部采购的方式。《飞机为何坠落:变化世界中的航空安全》一书的合著者约翰·斯特朗说:‘监管环境将完全改变。真正的问题是会发生什么样的改革。’ 答案恐怕与FAA如何有系统地推进变革有关。比如欣森因去年把通勤航空公司按大型民用航空公司一样监管而被称赞打破了官僚主义,而对于被批评只顾政治而不顾安全的佩纳以及布罗德里克,评价则褒贬不一。在FAA工作近20年的布罗德里克曾是强势且受尊敬的局长,他的支持者相信他是因对外公关而被牺牲。但也有人主张他固执、不肯承认问题。例如,在发生两起坠机死亡事故之后,他才开始调查涡轮发动机ATR-42通勤飞机机翼除冰的问题——而这正是NTSB在第一次坠机事故后就已通报过的问题。 许多航空专家认为,这对FAA乃至乘客来说是绝好的机会。一方面有人提议将FAA民营化,另一方面一些专家希望FAA为提升飞行安全而利用革命性技术,比如本可以阻止去年12月美国航空公司喷气客机在哥伦比亚卡利坠机事故的先进禁止起飞警告系统。然而,即使FAA不再在飞机坠落之后寻找借口,而是采取积极行动,飞机仍会坠落。航空安全专家鲁道夫·卡普斯汀说:‘我们打交道的是机器和人,而它们注定有缺陷。可悲的是,我们仍会遭遇事故。但我们可以减少事故。’ 亚当·科恩/亚特兰大 杰里·哈尼芬/华盛顿 词汇解说 yonder:更远的,更那边的 budget:符合预算的,廉价的 hot-botton:紧急的,重要的 red-tape:官署等使用的红带,官僚式繁琐程序 infraction:违反,侵害 drag on:拖延,缓慢持续 subcontractor:分包商,承包人 cut-rate:折扣价格的,普通的,品质差的 bidder:投标者 To the average trusting air traveler,things have come to a sorry pass indeedwhen lawmakers propose altering thelanguage of the Federal AviationAdministration charter to“put safetyfirst.‘Where in the great blue yonderdid it rank before? Last? Not exactly. Flying a U. S. airline isone of the safest ways to travel in theworld, and, in general, getting safer.But no thanks to the FAA's doggednesson the issue. Countless studies, journal-istic exposes and congressional hearingshave long made it clear that the FAA,with its split function of promoting andregulating the airline industry, has notalways moved so decisively as it mighthave on safety matters. Last week, with a sudden claritygenerated by the publicity, confusionand outrage surrounding the May 11crash of a ValuJet DC-9 in the FloridaEverglades, the FAA at lastacknowledged that it is time to cleanhouse and retool for the age ofderegulation which began in 1978.ValuJet chief Lewis Jordan signed aconsent order grounding the airline, andanother budget flyer, Kiwi, was orderedto cut back its fleet because of insuf-ficient pilot training. The FAA admin-istrator in charge of safety, AnthonyBroderick, bailed out, while FAA headDavid Hinson and Secretary of Trans-portation Federico Pena vowed to turntheir attention to such hot-button issuesas the use of subcontractors for aircraftmaintenance. They'll leave industrycheerleading to others. Given that thisdecision came after the death of 110people, questions linger about the FAA's capacity to untangle red tape and ef-fect radical change. The crash has shed light on someclassic failures in the FAA's handling oflow-cost carriers. For starters, after theValuJet tragedy, Hinson and Penatrumpeted the airline's safety recordstatements that began to seemincreasingly surreal as inspection reportsstarted popping up, showing ValuJethad committed enough infractions tomerit grounding months ago. A numberof FAA inspectors told TIME they sentregional offices and headquarters criticalreports that were ignored. There is talkof a criminal investigation. And thoughthe agency was concerned enough aboutValuJet earlier this year to run a specialreview, it was not till after the crashand a stepped-up, 30-day inspectionrevealing that planes repeatedly flewwith known defects and the airlineemployed unqualified mechanics thatValuJet planes were towed back to theirhangars. The FAA has long had a history ofsuch“benign tolerance.”Administrators, many of whom haveclose ties to the airline industry, havetaken great pleasure in touting thebillions of dollars consumers save byflying upstart airlines like ValuJet. Atthe same time, the agency has been re-luctant to force companies to use newtechnology, insisting on proof that thebenefits outweigh the costs to theairlines. In the late‘80s, for instance,the agency dragged its feet on requiringthe installation of the ground-proximitywarning system in commuter airlines,even though this simple device couldhave prevented a number of crashes.The National Transportation SafetyBoard (NTSB), a separate agency thatinvestigates crashes, has suggested thatthe FAA check flight-data recordersregularly not just after a crash to assessplanes and pilots. The rec-ommendation has gone nowhere. In particular, the FAA has been es-peciálly slow to monitor an increasinglycommon practice: airlines' using outsidecontractors to perform routine mainten-ance and repairs. Although the ValuJetcrash is now believed to have beencaused by mislabeled oxygen generatorsrather than an inspection or a mechan-ical failure, those generators had beenprepared for shipping by one such sub-contractor, SabreTech Inc., a Phoenix,Arizona, company that handled a num-ber of tasks for the airline. ValuJet president Jordan vehementlydefends this practice of outsourcing,saying it“has been done by the finestairlines. It is a sound concept; it is agood concept.”This is true. But thedrive to slash costs can sometimes leadto cut-rate care. The FAA has foundthat ValuJet contracted out all its main-tenance to“geographically diverse lowbidders”and that there were “multipleshortcomings”in the supervision of thefirms. According to experts, the re-lationship between an airline and itsmaintenance teams must be symbiotic.“You need well-trained people, peoplewhose morale is high,”explains LouisSmith, an Atlanta-based airline con-sultant. “When a third party comes be-tween you and these employees, youdon't know if this is the case.” Outsourcing is here to stay, however,and last week the FAA conceded that ithad been unprepared to handle the risein “virtual airlines” those assembled bycontracting out various servicecomponents, from maintenance toreservations. Why would a seemingly vital federalagency be so unprepared? For one thing,the FAA is financia11y strapped, andhas lost 5000 employees since 1993. Ithas a constant shortage of inspectors,and rather than inspecting, they mustdevote increasing amounts of time toclerical tasks. Moreover, the agencycontinues to assign inspectors accordingto the size of an airline rather than thenumber of subcontractors it uses. Theagency says it will change the way itmonitors outsourcing, requiring strictersupervision and compliance in the fu-ture. “The regulatory climate is going tobe quite changed,” says John Strong, co-author of a book called Why AirplanesCrash: Aviation Safety in a ChangingWorld. “The real question is,What kindof reform is going to take place?” The answer may have a lot to do withstaffing changes within the agency.While Hinson receives plaudits for try-ing to buck the bureaucracy for in-stance, by pushing last year to regulatecommuter airlines in the same way aslarger commercial airlines reviews aremixed about Pena, who has beencriticized for putting politics over safety,and about Broderick. In his nearly 20years at the FAA, Broderick was atough, respected administrator, and hissupporters believe he is being sacrificedon the altar of public relations. Butothewer accidents.” Reported by Adam Cohen/Atlanta andJerry Hannifin/Washington
1996-06-26 | 엘리자베스 글레이크 기자 By ELIZABETH GLEICK
果真能相信FAA吗 CAN WE EVER TRUST THE FAA?
本页标题和正文均由AI机器翻译,未经人工审校。准确内容请以韩文原文为准。






