1996-03-27 | 더귤라스 월러기자 By Douglas Waller/ Washington

目标再次锁定卡扎菲 TARGET GADDAFFI, AGAIN

本页标题和正文均由AI机器翻译,未经人工审校。准确内容请以韩文原文为准。

根据卫星照片和当地情报人员的报告,1992年底CIA小组得出结论:已收集到足够资料,可以制作出这座秘密工厂的计算机模型。随后,聚集在弗吉尼亚州兰利总部计算机终端前的专家们看到屏幕上呈现的影像时几乎窒息。那是一座面积数千平方米、高近三层的巨大地下建筑。两年前,华盛顿曾通过国际压力成功迫使利比亚拉布塔的化学武器工厂关闭。如今,穆阿马尔·卡扎菲正在塔尔胡纳市附近建造一座与拉布塔一模一样的第二座神经毒气工厂。而这一次,工厂被凿进山体侧面,使间谍卫星无法探测工厂内部,美国战机也无法实施空袭。 《时代》周刊援引情报机构消息人士报道后的四年间,美国政府一直展开激烈的秘密行动,阻止卡扎菲建成这座新工厂。在一定程度上,这一秘密行动——在CIA内部被称为“拉布塔Ⅱ行动”——取得了成功。卡扎菲原本希望拉布塔Ⅱ工厂从去年底开始生产化学武器,但建设进度远远落后于原定计划。这是因为CIA特工和国务院外交官瓦解了利比亚为走私工程所需外国技术人员和设备而建立的全球网络。但克林顿的亲信们承认,卡扎菲完成工厂的决心十分坚定,华盛顿所能做到的最好结果只是推迟而已。上月在国会作证时,CIA局长约翰·多伊奇承认,利比亚正在建设“世界最大的化学武器工厂”。 1990年,华盛顿威胁要空袭拉布塔工厂,同时公开了提供设备的欧洲企业名单,卡扎菲随即关闭了该工厂。但美国间谍卫星不久便发现,拉布塔的设备已被转移并存放在一英里外的地下掩体中。 第二年,CIA查明了原因。CIA迄今在深入渗透卡扎菲政府内部方面并未取得多大成功。但利比亚缺乏熟练技术人员,要进行大规模建设工程就必须引进数千名外国技术人员。得益于此,CIA得以在外国劳工中建立情报网,其中一人此次报告称,卡扎菲计划用拉布塔工厂的设备建造一座大型工厂。设备的大部分将被转移到塔尔胡纳附近山中的化学武器工厂。CIA的间谍卫星开始把镜头对准这座山。CIA全球各分站收到密电,指示现场人员从卡扎菲可能物色过的外国企业收集情报。 一位前CIA高级官员回忆,1992年初“CIA内部警铃开始大作”。分析人员担忧,利比亚计划让新工厂具备与两年内生产100吨芥子气和神经毒剂的拉布塔工厂相同的产能。专家们得出结论:若不摧毁新设施,卡扎菲宠爱的恐怖分子将拥有足够使用十年的化学武器。 卡扎菲在设计这座工厂时似乎获得了最高水平的援助,新工厂几乎坚不可摧。CIA的秘密特工怀疑,卡扎菲掌握了冷战时期前苏联建造庞大地下指挥所时使用的设计图纸。只有用核弹在山顶实施直接命中才能摧毁该工厂。把常规炸弹精准投入入口事实上不可能,从攻击机上发射的精确制导火箭或巡航导弹也无法被编程为迂回飞行后找到山体入口并摧毁其中的设施。 入口位于两座山顶之间一条狭长山谷的中段。一条两车道公路通向入口,宽度足以让两辆拖车并行通过。但进入不到100英尺,道路便因巨大岩壁而分开。两条车道在工厂巨大厅室的另一侧重新汇合。其他厅室与正在建设的中心设施相连。负责监督特种部队“三角洲部队”和“海豹六队”的五角大楼联合特种作战司令部研究了塔尔胡纳的设计后得出结论:突击队进攻将是自杀行动。 CIA认定,阻止塔尔胡纳项目的唯一途径是让其建设陷入泥潭。CIA的化学工厂与隧道建设专家利用计算机制作了精细的工序图,以找出要害环节。为购买建设设备,卡扎菲构建了由空壳公司和中间商组成的采购网络。为此,CIA和国务院官员说服意大利、瑞士、日本、丹麦、奥地利、英国、波兰政府,阻止向利比亚运送从这些国家企业购得的设备。 CIA认为,这一制裁措施将使卡扎菲已经购入的几项重要设备——用于开凿山体隧道的60吨重旋转式掘进机——变为废物。分析人员查明,这些设备是德国制造商威斯特法利亚—贝科里特的产品。该德国公司的高管对德国政府官员表示,他们合法地把设备交付给了一家泰国企业,而这家泰国企业声称,利比亚购买设备是为在灌溉工程中开凿公路隧道。 1993年初,CIA前往德国总理赫尔穆特·科尔办公室,向其助手们出示了有关塔尔胡纳的卫星照片和情报报告。情报分析人员已弄清掘进机中最关键的部件是什么。正是位于设备最前端的部件,在向山体内开凿6码高、8码宽的洞口过程中会迅速磨损耗尽。这一部件必须不断更换。CIA告诉科尔的助手们切断备件供应,不久掘进机便无法使用。1988年,因德国企业曾向原拉布塔工厂供应设备的揭露报道令其震惊,科尔当时迅速命令威斯特法利亚—贝科里特公司切断备件供应渠道。 CIA起初认为,使掘进机报废将使塔尔胡纳项目延迟十年。但CIA并不详细掌握在备件耗尽之前利比亚的隧道工程推进到何种程度。加之卡扎菲巧妙地规避了美国的阻挠行动。来自欧洲的设备供应变得困难后,利比亚开始在化学武器相关出口管制宽松的中国、印度、东南亚寻找供应渠道。美国国务院查明,泰国企业在政府支持下派遣建筑工人前往塔尔胡纳工厂工作。威斯特法利亚—贝科里特公司称,卡扎菲可以从其他公司获得部件。CIA对卡扎菲是否从别处购入部件不予置评。 美国目前预计工厂将在90年代末投入运转。“这种事情是无法阻止的。只能减缓其完成速度、争取时间而已”,一位美国情报消息人士说。正如CIA特工所担心的,一旦时间耗尽,这个危险的国际不法之徒将具备无限量生产大规模杀伤性武器的能力。 BY THE END OF 1992, drawingon satellite photos and reports fromspies on the ground, the CIA teamdecided it had enough data to producea computer model of the secret plant.When the experts gathered around aterminal at the agency's headquartersin Langley, Virginia, what they sawon the video screen took their breathaway. It was a huge undergroundchamber of several thousand squarefeet, almost three stories high. Twoyears earlier , W as hington hadsucceeded in an international cam-paign to close down Libya's chemical-weapons plant at Rabta. NowMuammar Gaddafi was building asecond nerve-gas plant near thetown of Tarhunah just like the one atRabta. Only this time it was carvedinto the side of a mountain where nospy-satellite eyes could see the fac-tory inside and no American jetscould destroy it. During the four years since, intelli-gence sources tell Time, the U.S.government has waged an intensivecovert battle to prevent Gaddafi fromfinishing his new factory. And to adegree, the highly secret campaign -known within the CIA as the “Rabta-11 Operation”- has succeeded.Gaddafi wanted Rabta- ⅡⅡ to be pro-ducing chemicals by last year, butconstruction is far behind schedule.That's because CIA officers andState Department diplomats havedisrupted the global network Libyaset up to smuggle in foreign workersand equipment for the project. ButClinton aides concede Gaddafi re-mains determined to finish the fa-cility, and · the best Washington hasdone as yet is delay the inevitable.Last month in congressional testi-mony, CIA Director John Deutch ad-mitted that Libya was still busybuilding what he called “the world'slargest underground chemical-weapons plant. ” In 1990 Gaddafi shut down theRabta plant after Washingtonthreatened to attack it withwarplanes and publicly identifiedEuropean companies that had pro-vided equipment. But U.S. satellitessoon discovered that Rabta's equip-ment had been moved and stored inunderground bunkers a mile away. The next year the agency learnedwhy. The CIA has never had muchluck penetrating the inner circles ofGaddafi's government. But becauseLibya has few skilled workers, itimports thousands of foreigntechnicians for big constructionprojects. The agency was able to de-velop a network of informants amongthe foreign workers, and one of themnow reported that Gaddafi had bigplans for the Rabta hardware. Muchof it would eventually be moved to anew chemical-weapons plant insidea mountain near Tarhunah. CIA spysatellites immediately began pointingtheir cameras at the mountain. Secretcables went out to CIA stationsworldwide ordering case officers tocollect intelligence from foreign firmsGaddafi might have enlisted for theproject. A former senior CIA official recallsthat in early 1992 “alarm bells startedringing at the agency.” Analystsfeared that Libya intended the plantto have the same capacity as theoriginal Rabta facility, which overtwo years produced about 100 tons ofmustard gas and nerve agents. Un-less destroyed, the experts concluded,the new factory could keep Gaddafi'sfavorite terrorists well stocked withchemical poisons for decades. Gaddafi appeared to have receivedsome topflight help in designing theplant so it would be virtually im-pregnable. CIA clandestine officerssuspected that he had got hold ofblueprints the former Soviet Unionused to build its large network ofunderground bomb shelters duringthe cold war. Only a direct hit by anuclear warhead on top of the moun-tain could take out the plant. Sneak-ing a conventional bomb through thefront door would be impossible, and aprecision-guided projectile fired froman attack jet or a cruise missile couldnever be programmed to twist andturn its way into the mountain's en-trance and destroy the equipment in-side. The entrance is located in themiddle of a long, narrow valley be-tween two mountain peaks. A two-lane road wide enough to accommo-date two tractor-trailer trucks sideby side runs into the entrance. Butless than a hundred feet inside, thetwo lanes split around a giant rockwall: The lanes rejoin on the otherside into a huge chamber for the fac-tory. Other chambers that connect tothe main one are being dug. The Pen-tagon's Joint Special Operations Com-mand, which oversees Delta Force andseal Team-6, studied the Tarhunahlayout and concluded that a commandoraid would be a suicide mission. The only way to stop theTarhunah project, the CIA decided,was to bog down its construction.Agency experts on chemical factoriesand tunneling used computers tobuild elaborate construction-flowcharts that identified choke points.To buy equipment, Gaddafi had setup a purchasing network, operatingthrough Iront companies anamiddlemen around the world. CIAand State Department officialspersuaded governments in Italy,Switzerland, Japan, Denmark,Austria, Britain and Poland to stopdeliveries of equipment Libya1 hadbought from their companies. The CIA decided that this inter-diction method could also cripplesome critical equipment that Gaddafihad already purchased - 60-ton rotary boring machines used to tun-nelinto the mountain. Analysts tracedthem to the German manufacturerWestfalia-Becorit. The firm'sexecutives told German officials theylegally delivered the machines to aThai company, which claimed Libyabought them to build road tunnels fora river irrigation project. In early 1993 a CIA team marchedinto the offices of German ChancellorHelmut Kohl and spread out beforehis aides their satellite photos andintelligence reports on Tarhunah.The analysts had identified a keypart in the boring machines: thelarge bits at the front, which wouldquickly wear out as they cut a holesix yards high and eight yards wideinto the mountain. These had to beconstantly replaced. Stop the supplyof spare bits, the CIA men told Kohl'S advisers, and the boring machineswould soon become useless. Embar-rassed by revelations in 1988 thatGerman companies had helped equipthe original Rabta plant, Kohlquickly ordered Westfalia-Becorit toshut down the spare-parts pipeline. The CIA at first thought disablingthe boring machines would set theTarhunah project back 10 years. Butthe agency has never had detailedintelligence on how much progressthe Libyans had made with thetunneling before the drill bits woreout. Moreover, Gaddafi has skillfullyfound ways around Washington'sroadblocks. When European sourcesfor equipment dried up, Libya beganprowling for suppliers in China, Indiaand Southeast Asia, where exportcontrols on chemical weapons-related equipment are loose. TheState Department has found thatThai companies, operating behindtheir government's back, are stillsupplying construction workers forthe plant. Westfalia-Becorit‘smanagers say Gaddafi could evenfind bits from other companies。 TheCIA refuses·to comment on whetheror not he has. The White House now believes thefactory could be oPerating by the endof this decade. “You never stop any-thing like this”, a U.S. intelligencesource says. “You only slow it downand buy time.”When time runs out, asthe CIA harriers Year it will, an un-stable international outlaw will havethe means for 1imitless manufacture ofweaPons of mass destruction. 词汇解说 ◆the inevitable:不可避免之事,此处指卡扎菲建设化学武器工厂的计划 ◆inner circles:权力核心的亲信集团,核心权力层 ◆big plans:工厂建设计划 4case officer:情报收集人员 ◆Stock:股票、库存、储备、填满。此处意为配备设备 ◆topflight:一流的、最高级的 ◆impregnable:无法攻克的,与invincible同义 ◆sneak:偷偷进入,sneakers为运动鞋 ◆bog down:陷入泥潭。此处意为阻挠 ◆choke point:气孔、要害 ◆front company:藏身处,文中用作空壳公司之意 ◆spread out:摊开 ◆bits:掘进设备的部件 ◆prowl:四处寻找、徘徊 ◆harrier:猎犬