1995-10-26 | 하워드 추아언 기자 HOWARD CHUA-EOAN

美国出手相助日本银行 Lending a Hand to Godzilla

本页标题和正文均由AI机器翻译,未经人工审校。准确内容请以韩文原文为准。

首尔经济新闻每周从美国代表性时事周刊《时代》的主要内容中选取一两个主题,于每周四以译文与原文并载的形式刊登一个版面。近来国内也引进了许多外国刊物,但众所周知,《时代》正是以最精炼的英文讲述当今地球村最普遍关心的话题。因此本版不仅仅止于传达《时代》的中文内容,而是同时展现原文之美,以拓宽对英文感兴趣的读者的选择。翻译由著有《正确阅读〈时代〉的方法》等书的金大钧先生(延世大学外国语学堂讲师)担任。【编者注】 “他们不断要求我隐瞒亏损。”这名身着灰色细竖条纹西装、低着头的入狱银行家,把这句话读给美国地区法院法官迈克尔·穆卡西听。但上周利久保俊秀(图示原文:Toshihide Iguchi)所说的话,其回响远远超出了纽约市法庭。他不仅因隐瞒其在大和银行纽约分行运营中造成的11亿美元亏损(并个人获利逾50万美元)而被判有罪;他还暗示,这家全球规模第13位的银行中若干未具名的高层高管与他共谋,使该灾难不为美国联邦储备委员会所知。在伦敦,反映日本银行体系最新灾难的伦敦银行同业拆借利率(London Inter-Bank Offered Rates)大幅攀升。驻东京的所罗门兄弟公司分析师阿莉西亚·小川这样说:“这一新事态只会加深对日本各银行的不信任。” 这一自白是上周第二起重创日本银行体系昔日崇高声誉的爆料。三天前,美国众议院银行委员会主席吉姆·里奇披露,若流动性危机围困日本银行在美国的子公司,联邦储备委员会已同意予以援助。这一消息在两国政府官员中引发担忧。日本担心违反协定的保密义务会对日本银行的稳定性提出更多疑问,从而引发金融市场不安。而联邦储备委员会将该项安排描述为实际上没有风险,则在美国引起愤怒。参议院银行委员会主席、纽约州的阿方斯·达马托致信联邦储备委员会主席艾伦·格林斯潘表示,这样的安排“可能使美国纳税人处于难以理解的境地,去支撑、甚或更糟地用钱救助日本的金融机构”。 上述自白与里奇的陈述立即抬高了日本银行的经营成本,使其处境更为艰难。日本各银行目前就其国际同业借款支付0.3%至0.4%的溢价。但在法庭陈述之后,针对困境更深的日本银行,“日本溢价”几乎翻了一倍。此外,在里奇披露联邦储备委员会与日本达成协议的事实之后,该溢价也在缓步上升。美国的举措产生了双重效果:既向金融市场再度保证日本拥有紧急安全装置,同时也暗示日本各银行必定陷入了严重困境。 正当大藏省采取戏剧性措施以彻底清除这一混乱之际,国际市场对日本银行的不信任却根源多样且深远。大和事件至少显示了日本一家主要银行的经营可以何等粗劣。大和与大藏省拖延过久,未能向美国通告亏损,该银行还利用作为公开收购对象的空壳小公司隐藏亏损。上周大和银行大阪总部的管理人员只是表示,要求其继续操作仅仅是为了“防止他逃脱罪责”。总体而言,日本各银行一直未披露其不良贷款的规模。它们也未能从会计账簿上清除自房地产市场崩溃以来已丧失价值的巨额不动产。“这是效率低下的问题。美国在三四年内摆脱了银行问题,但在日本这一问题已延续五年,而且局势距离解决并不比五年前更近”,驻东京的高盛公司分析师戴维·阿特金森说。 美国怎么会被卷入对日本企业的救助?如果非日系金融机构对日本体制的缺陷足够警觉,它们就不会再向日本银行收取贷款溢价,而会决定全面停止放贷。大藏省可以一次性救助日本的一家主要银行,甚至三四家主要银行,但对日本银行的全球性信用关闭——无论人们认为这多么不可能——都可能引发全球性金融灾难。正是这一点促使格林斯潘代表联邦储备委员会提出援助。“这一举措关乎双方的利益,也含蓄地显示了关切与准备的程度”,中央银行专家史蒂文·所罗门说。 为给银行注射紧急流动性促进剂,日本将回收目前由日本银行持有的逾1000亿美元美国公债中的一部分,由联邦储备委员会支付。这笔钱将仅用于支撑日本银行在美国的子公司,而非日本本土的母公司。联邦储备委员会强调这一点,希望以此平息美国国内的政治抵触。该协定得以达成的根本理由之一,是保证日本政府与日本金融机构持有的美国公债得以有序清算。银行顾问爱德华·富拉希这样说:“如果日本为使其银行体系恢复流动性而把美国公债抛向市场,那将推高利率、引发动荡与通胀,并使金融体系不稳。美国没有能力承受失控的公债行情与高利率。” 尽管如此,参议员达马托仍要求就大和银行提交完整报告,并说明美国当局究竟何时得知这一危机。他对联邦储备委员会意图援助日本的“秘密计划”依然持批评态度。但事实上,大多数此类协定都保持秘密。虽然联邦储备银行与日本大藏省拒绝向里奇的听证会派出官员,联邦储备委员会与财政部曾就该计划向里奇作过说明。委员会听证会的一名参加者这样说:“格林斯潘认为,银行问题过于敏感,无法在那种公开讨论会上讨论。”也许他说得对。 The Fed pitches in as the Daiwa scandal andother ills shake up Japan's banks THEY ASKED ME TO CONTINUE concealing the losses.〃With head bowed, the jailed banker in a gray, pinstriped suit read those wordsto U.S. District Judge Michael Mukasey. But Toshihide Iguchi's wordslast week reverberated far beyond the New York City courtroom. Not omy was hepleading guilty to covering up the $1.1 billion in losses he hadincurred for Daiwa Bank's New York operations (and personally profiting by more than $500000).He was also implicating unnamed senior executives at the bank-the world's 13th 1argest-in a conspiracy with him tokeep the catastrophe secret from theU.S.Federal Reserve Board. In London interbank lending rates jumped to reflect this latest blow to the Japanese banking system. Says Alicia 0gawa, an analyst at Salomon Brothers in Tokyo: "This new development serves only to increase distrust ofJapanese banks." The Iguchi confession was the second revelation last week to batter the once towering reputation of Tokyo'.s banking system. Three days earlier,Jim Leach, chairman of the U.S.House Banking Committee, had disclosed that the Fed had agreed to cometo the rescue if a liquidity crisis beset .U. S. subsidiaries of Japan's banks. The news provoked concern among government officials.in both countries. Tokyo feared that breaching the agreement's secrecy would create financial-market anxiety by raisingmore questions about Japanese banking stability. The Fed's portrayal ofthe agreement as virtually risk freeraised hackles in Washington. NewYork's Alfonse D'Amato, chairmanof the Senate Banking Committee,wrote Fed chairman Alan Greenspan,saying such an arrangement "could place U.S.taxpayers in the inexplicable position of propping up, or even worse,baliling out, Japanese financial institutions." The Iguchi confession and the Leach statement immediately made things tougher for Japan's banks by increasing their cost of doing business. Japan's banks are now usually charged apremium of 0.3%to 0.4%for their international interbank borrowing. After Iguchi spoke in court, however, the "Japan premium" nearly doubled for the more troubled Japanesebanks. The premium had also edgedhigher after Leach revealed the existence of the Fed's agreement with Tokyo. The U.S. move had a double-edged effect-while it servedto reassure financial markets of an emergency backstopfor Tokyo, it also implied that Japan's banks must be in serious trouble. The distrust of Japanese banks on the international markets has diverse and deeproots, even as the Ministryof Finances is taking dramatic steps to clean up the mess. The Daiwa case has shown how shoddy managementcan be in at least one majorJapanese bank. Daiwa and the ministry waited too longto notify the U.S. of the losses. and the bank used shellcompanies to hide losses. Last week officials at Daiwa's Osaka headquarters wouldsay only that Iguchi was asked to carry on simply to "prevent him from escaping."As a whole, Japanese bankshave failed to divulge the extent of their bad loans. They have also failed to clear their books of huge amounts of real estate that have lost value since the property market's collapse. "It's a question of inefficiency," says David Atkinson, an analyst for Goldman Sachs in Tokyo. "The U.S. got out of its banking problems in tlhree or, fouryears, but in Japan this issue has been running for five years and it's not much closer to resolution than it was five years ago." How might the U.S. be drawn intoa Japanese bailout? If non-Japanese financial institutions become sufficiently alarmed about the Tokyo system's shortcomings, they may no longer choose to charge a premium on loans to Japans's banks but decide to stop making loans altogether. While the Ministry of Finance could handle the rescue of a major bank or even severalat one time in Japan, a worldwide shutdown of credit to Japanese banks.however unlikely would result in global financial catastrophe. That is theprospect that triggered Greenspan's offer of assistance from the Fed. "Thisstep is in the interest of both sides. an indication of the level of concern and preparation," says Steven Solomon,an expert on central banks. To give its banks an emergency booster shot of liquidity, Japan wouldredeem a portion of the more than $100 billion in American governmentsecurities now held by the Bank of Japan, which the Bank of Japan, which the Fed would pay dollars for. The money would be used to shore uponly the American subsidiaries of Japanese banks, not the parent companies in Japan, a point the Fed has emphasized in the hope of quelling political resistance in the U.S. Part ofits rationale for the deal is to ensurean orderly liquidation of American securities held by Tokyo and Japanese financial institutions. Says banking consultant Edward Furash:"If theJapanese throw U.S. bonds on themarket to reliquefy their banking system. that will raise interest rates,cause turmoil, inflation, and destabilize the financial system. America cannot afford to have a run-away bond market and higher interest rates." Nevertheless, Senator D'Amato has called for a full report on Daiwa and exactly When U.S. authorities knew of the crisis. He remains critical of the Fed's "secret plan"to aid Japan. In fact, though, most such arrangements are kept secret. The Fed and the Treasury had briefed Leach on the plan, although both the Fed and the Japanese Ministry of Financedeclined to send officials to Leach'shearing.Says a participant in the committee hearing: "Greenspan thought the banking issue was too sensitive to be discussed in that sort of publis forum." He was probably right. -Reported by Edward W.Desmond/Tokyo, Barbara Rudolph/New York and Adam ZagorinlWashington